The effect of auditory verbal imagery on signal detection in hallucination-prone individuals by Moseley, Peter et al.
  
 
 
Moseley, P, Smailes, D, Ellison, A & Fernyhough, C 2016, 'The effect 
of auditory verbal imagery on signal detection in hallucination-prone 
individuals' Cognition, vol 146, pp. 206-216., 
10.1016/j.cognition.2015.09.015 
© The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an Open Access 
article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution license (CC BY) 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). 
 
Cognition 146 (2016) 206–216Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Cognition
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate /COGNITThe effect of auditory verbal imagery on signal detection
in hallucination-prone individualshttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2015.09.015
0010-0277/ 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
⇑ Corresponding author at: School of Psychology, University of Central
Lancashire, Preston PR1 2HE, UK.
E-mail address: pmoseley@uclan.ac.uk (P. Moseley).Peter Moseley a,b,⇑, David Smailes a,c, Amanda Ellison a, Charles Fernyhough a
a Psychology Department, Durham University, South Road, Durham DH1 3LE, UK
b School of Psychology, University of Central Lancashire, Preston PR1 2HE, UK
cDepartment of Psychology, Leeds Trinity University, Horsforth, Leeds, LS18 5HD, UK
a r t i c l e i n f oArticle history:
Received 17 April 2015
Revised 17 September 2015
Accepted 19 September 2015
Available online 1 October 2015
Keywords:
Auditory imagery
Inner speech
Hallucinations
Imagery–perception interactiona b s t r a c t
Cognitive models have suggested that auditory hallucinations occur when internal mental events, such as
inner speech or auditory verbal imagery (AVI), are misattributed to an external source. This has been
supported by numerous studies indicating that individuals who experience hallucinations tend to per-
form in a biased manner on tasks that require them to distinguish self-generated from non-self-
generated perceptions. However, these tasks have typically been of limited relevance to inner speech
models of hallucinations, because they have not manipulated the AVI that participants used during the
task. Here, a new paradigm was employed to investigate the interaction between imagery and
perception, in which a healthy, non-clinical sample of participants were instructed to use AVI whilst com-
pleting an auditory signal detection task. It was hypothesized that AVI-usage would cause participants to
perform in a biased manner, therefore falsely detecting more voices in bursts of noise. In Experiment 1,
when cued to generate AVI, highly hallucination-prone participants showed a lower response bias than
when performing a standard signal detection task, being more willing to report the presence of a voice
in the noise. Participants not prone to hallucinations performed no differently between the two
conditions. In Experiment 2, participants were not specifically instructed to use AVI, but retrospectively
reported how often they engaged in AVI during the task. Highly hallucination-prone participants who
retrospectively reported using imagery showed a lower response bias than did participants with lower
proneness who also reported using AVI. Results are discussed in relation to prominent inner speech
models of hallucinations.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
1.1. Auditory verbal hallucinations and inner speech
Auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) are the experience of
hearing a voice in the absence of any speaker. Although commonly
associated with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, AVHs also occur in
around 1.5–3% of the healthy, nonclinical population (Tien,
1991). There is emerging evidence that the predisposition to AVHs
may lie on a continuum, ranging from individuals who frequently
experience, to individuals who rarely or never report, hallucina-
tions (Johns & van Os, 2001; Johns et al., 2014). A fruitful area of
investigation is therefore to investigate whether cognitive traits
and biases associated with hallucinations in clinical populationsare shared by individuals in the general population who report fre-
quent hallucinatory experiences (Badcock & Hugdahl, 2012).
The most prominent cognitive model of AVHs suggests that they
occur when an internal mental event (such as inner
speech or auditory verbal imagery – AVI) is misattributed to an
external source (Ditman & Kuperberg, 2005; Frith, 1992; Jones &
Fernyhough, 2007b). This strand of research has been embedded
in the source monitoring framework, which attempts to explain
how we make judgements regarding the origin of information (i.e.,
its source; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). Specifically, an
externalising bias in reality monitoring, which refers to the ability
to distinguish between internally generated and externally gener-
ated perceptions, has been linked to AVHs (Bentall, Baker, &
Havers, 1991). Externalising biases have variously been linked to
excessively vivid mental imagery (Aleman, Böcker, Hijman, de
Haan, & Kahn, 2003), and low cognitive effort/intrusiveness associ-
ated with mental imagery (Jones & Fernyhough, 2009; Morrison,
Haddock, & Tarrier, 1995). On a mechanistic level, forward models
may be involved in predicting the sensory consequences of motor
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one way in which self-generated actions are experienced as such
(Frith, Blakemore, &Wolpert, 2000). Aberrant efference copymech-
anisms could therefore underlie themisattribution of internalmen-
tal events to an external, non-self source (Ford & Mathalon, 2005).
Reality monitoring for verbal stimuli has typically been
assessed using source memory paradigms, which require partici-
pants to recall whether words were spoken by the experimenter
or by themselves. A common finding is that patients with a diagno-
sis of schizophrenia who hallucinate, compared to those who do
not hallucinate, are more likely to misremember words as having
been spoken by the experimenter, but do not make the reverse
error (e.g., Brunelin et al., 2006; Woodward, Menon, & Whitman,
2007). That is, participants who hallucinate tend to show an
‘externalising bias’ on reality monitoring tasks. Consistent
with continuum models of AVHs (Van Os, Hanssen, Bijl, & Ravelli,
2000), non-clinical samples who report higher levels of
hallucination-proneness also show a similar pattern of responding
on reality monitoring tasks (Brookwell, Bentall, & Varese, 2013;
Larøi, Van der Linden, & Marczewski, 2004).1
However, these tasks are not ideally positioned to test models of
AVHs that specify the misattribution of internal mental events such
as inner speech, for twomain reasons: (1) they are not ‘online’ mea-
sures (source memory tasks, for example, are ‘offline’ in that they
require participants to decide who generated words earlier in the
testing session); (2) they are either not specific to monitoring of
speech or, if they are, are likely to use ‘overt’ (out loud) speech, as
opposed to engaging the participant in auditory verbal imagery or
inner speech. This limits the applicability of the results to inner
speech models of AVHs, because it assumes that overt vocalisation
in an experimental situationutilises the samemechanisms as covert
or inner speech. Although there is evidence that overt and covert
speech share cognitive and neural mechanisms, particularly in rela-
tion to the motor system (Alderson-Day & Fernyhough, 2015;
Perrone-Bertolotti, Rapin, Lachaux, & Lœvenbruck, 2014), any infer-
ences from studies using overt speech about the nature of covert
speech are necessarily indirect, and based on the assumption that
similarities between the two are more significant than the
differences.
A similar line of research has attempted to engage the partici-
pant in an ‘online’ decision making process, referred to as ‘reality
discrimination’, requiring participants to immediately respond as
to whether a perception was internal or external (in contrast to
the ‘offline’ decisions required in a source memory task, which typ-
ically require a decision to be made at a later time point, e.g.,
Woodward et al., 2007). Reality discrimination tasks typically take
the form of signal detection tasks, in which the participant must
decide whether a voice was present in a burst of noise. In these
tasks, hallucinating patients tend to show a bias towards respond-
ing that a voice is present in the noise (Varese, Barkus, & Bentall,
2012). In a non-clinical sample, participants who reported more
hallucinatory experiences also showed the same bias in responding
(Barkus et al., 2011). These findings have been linked theoretically
to the reality monitoring tasks described above, as providing
evidence linking AVHs to an externalising bias (Brookwell et al.,
2013). It is unclear, however, to what extent performance on audi-
tory signal detection tasks relates to inner speech/AVI processes,
since participants are not specifically instructed to use imagery
during the task. One way to address this concern would be to
employ a paradigm that requires participants to engage in covert
AVI, whilst simultaneously detecting the presence or absence of a
similar auditory verbal stimulus.1 Although meta-analytic evidence robustly shows that externalising biases are
associated with hallucinations in clinical and non-clinical populations, it is, of course,
possible that these are a result, rather than a cause, of experiencing hallucinations.1.2. Mental imagery and perception
Previous research on the interaction between mental imagery
and perception has come closest to meeting the two criteria
outlined above (engaging participants in an online task, and con-
trolling the mental imagery they generate while performing the
task). Perky (1910) carried out a series of experiments that
suggested that visual imagery interfered with the simultaneous
perception of a visually presented stimulus (subsequently referred
to as the Perky Effect). For example, participants who engaged in
visual mental imagery of an object took longer to detect a visually
presented stimulus of the same object than did participants who
did not generate any mental imagery. This was taken to indicate
that, since mental imagery and perception could be confused, they
must rely on similar mechanisms.
However, others have found that mental imagery actually facil-
itates perception in the visual modality (Peterson & Graham, 1974).
This finding has also been replicated in the auditory modality; for
example, Farah and Smith (1983) engaged participants in auditory
imagery of a pure tone, whilst simultaneously requiring them to
detect a similar tone in noise. Participants were therefore required
to distinguish between self-generated, internal mental imagery
and an external stimulus. Using auditory imagery facilitated per-
ception of the tone, although the task used did not include trials
with no signal present, and so signal detection analysis was not
reported. Findings on the interaction between imagery and percep-
tion have, therefore, been equivocal. More recently, Aleman et al.
(2003) used a similar paradigm with a sample of patients with a
diagnosis of schizophrenia, showing that the ‘gain’ on perception
of a pure tone due to auditory imagery was strongly correlated
with hallucination severity. This finding was interpreted as reflect-
ing an over-reliance on top-down processes in hallucinating
patients (which could also be related to a bias towards labelling
internal imagery as external).
One problem with these studies is that they do not measure the
effect of imagery on the tendency to falsely detect a signal in noise,2
because there is always a signal present. This is a key variable when
linking performance to the tendency to hallucinate, and also when
performing signal detection analysis. From the data presented by
Aleman et al. (2003), for example, it is not possible to tell whether
the ‘gain’ on perception was due to a change in sensitivity (an
increased ability to distinguish signal from noise), or a change in
response bias (i.e., participants being more willing to respond that
a tone was present when using imagery). The previously discussed
literature relating to biases in reality monitoring/discrimination
would imply that it may be the latter. Imagery–perception
interaction tasks, though, have the advantage of directly engaging
participants in internal mental imagery (as opposed to speaking
aloud), and requiring them to distinguish whether any subsequent
perception was internally generated or not, hence addressing the
concern about reality discrimination tasks described above. As well
as being informative on the nature of mental imagery, this makes
the tasks ideal for testing inner speech models of AVHs.
1.3. Valence and externalising biases
A further question stemming from inner speech models of AVHs
relates to what may cause one instance of inner speech to become
misattributed, but not another instance. As discussed, source
monitoring theories may appeal to vividness of mental imagery
and the effort associated with cognitions, but theories of AVHs2 Farah and Smith (1983), however, note that many participants, when using
auditory imagery of a pure tone, reported hearing the tone at times discordant with
when the tone was actually presented, implying that imagery may have cause false
detections. These false alarm responses were not quantified, however.
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more likely to become misattributed (Morrison et al., 1995). This
is consistent with reports that AVHs are more likely to occur in
conditions of negative affect or stress (Nayani & David, 1996),
and with the well-replicated finding that, at least in psychiatrically
healthy individuals, negative events are more likely to be dis-
missed as attributable to a non-self cause (Mezulis, Abramson,
Hyde, & Hankin, 2004).
However, the findings of studies that have investigated whether
negatively valenced cognitions in source memory/signal detection
tasks are more likely to become externally misattributed than neu-
tral or positively-valenced cognitions have been inconsistent
(Bendall, Jackson, & Hulbert, 2011; Morrison et al., 1995). In a
recent meta-analysis of these studies (Brookwell et al., 2013),
slightly larger externalising biases were observed in studies that
employed positive (Hedges g = 0.75), than negative (g = 0.62), or
than neutral stimuli (g = 0.50). However, because of the designs
of the synthesized studies, it was not possible to examine whether
these effect sizes differed from one another, which makes drawing
any conclusions very difficult (especially when only five studies
were included in the meta-analysis). Recent work investigating
how emotion can modulate intentional binding (a low-level mea-
sure of sensorimotor agency) showed that intentional binding
was reduced (i.e., participants’ sense of agency over their actions
was reduced) when participants’ actions were paired with a nega-
tive emotional outcome in comparison to when actions were
paired with a neutral or positive outcome (Yoshie & Haggard,
2013). Thus, there are reasons to believe that negatively-valenced
cognitions are more likely to be misattributed to an external source
than are neutral or positively-valenced cognitions. However, fur-
ther work is needed to establish whether this is the case.
1.4. The present study
The present study therefore set out to test whether perfor-
mance on an auditory signal detection task was affected by the
generation of auditory verbal mental imagery, and whether this
was modulated by the emotional valence of the stimuli, and/or
self-reported hallucination-proneness, in a non-clinical sample.
This extends previous research by directly linking the putative
‘raw material’ of AVHs – auditory imagery – with a frequently used
task that can elicit false perceptions, with the participant engaged
immediately in a decision about the perceptual origin of a
stimulus.
Two key changes were made to previous paradigms investigat-
ing AVI and signal detection. Firstly, trials in which no signal was
present were included, to allow the generation of ‘false alarm’
responses and the calculation of relevant signal detection mea-
sures. Secondly, the signal detected was a voice (as opposed to a
pure tone), in order to maximise the relevance of the task to inner
speech models of AVHs. We conducted two experiments which
manipulated or measured the extent to which participants gener-
ated AVI. In Experiment 1, participants completed two blocks of
auditory signal detection: one in which they were cued with a
short sentence and required to generate AVI of that sentence whilst
performing the task, and one in which there was no cued sentence
or instruction to use AVI. In Experiment 2, a different sample of
participants completed two blocks of auditory signal detection:
one in which there was no cued sentence or instruction to use
AVI, and one in which they were cued with a short sentence, but
with no instruction to use AVI. Participants then retrospectively
reported the extent to which they engaged in AVI whilst attempt-
ing to detect the auditory stimulus.
We predicted that use of AVI would lead to a lower response
bias, because participants would have more opportunity to misat-
tribute a self-generated event to an external source. Such a biaswould lead participants to correctly detect more voices in the
noise, but also incorrectly detect more voices in the noise (i.e.,
report hearing a voice when none was present). Furthermore,
drawing on the previous literature linking signal detection perfor-
mance and AVHs, we predicted that participants who scored highly
on self-report measures of proneness to hallucinations may be
particularly vulnerable to this effect. Finally, consistent with the
findings of Yoshie and Haggard (2013), and with previous findings
relating to self-attribution biases mentioned above, we predicted
that participants’ response biases would be lower when they
generated negative AVI than when they generated positive AVI.2. Experiment 1
In the first experiment, participants performed an auditory sig-
nal detection task under two conditions: (1) with a visually pre-
sented verbal cue and an instruction to use AVI, and (2) with no
cue, and no instruction to use AVI. We predicted that using ima-
gery would lower participants’ response bias (making them more
likely to report hearing a voice in the noise), but have no effect
on sensitivity (the ability to distinguish between the voice and
the noise). In half of the trials, participants were asked to engage
in positive AVI (e.g., ‘‘I am good”) and in half, participants were
asked to engage in negative AVI (‘‘I am bad”). We predicted that
participants’ response bias would be lower when generating nega-
tive AVI than when generating positive AVI.
2.1. Materials and methods
2.1.1. Participants
The sample consisted of 125 participants from the undergradu-
ate and staff population of Durham University, UK. Five
participants were excluded from the final sample, due to technical
malfunctions during the testing session (n = 3), or because their
task sensitivity (d0 – see below) was classified as an outlier (>4.5
standard deviations above the mean) (n = 2). The final sample size
was therefore 120 (number of females = 91; mean age = 20.7 years,
SD = 2.5, range = 18–30 years). All participants were native English
speakers and none reported any hearing problems. In return for
their time, participants were given course credit or a small
payment.
2.1.2. Signal detection task
The task required participants to listen to bursts of noise, and to
respond whether a voice stimulus was present in the noise. All par-
ticipants completed two conditions: one block in which they were
asked to use auditory verbal imagery whilst detecting the stimuli
(the ‘AVI’ condition) and one block in which they were not (the
‘non-AVI’ condition).
Each block of the signal detection task (SDT) consisted of 80 tri-
als, each lasting 5 s (plus response time). Fig. 1 shows an illustra-
tion of a single trial of the task. In the AVI condition, participants
were first presented with a 3–4 syllable sentence, in the centre
of the screen, for 1.5 s. In the non-AVI condition, participants were
simply presented with a blank screen for 1.5 s. This was followed
by an on-screen countdown, which consisted of a shrinking circle,
to mimic a ‘3, 2, 1. . .’ countdown. (It was not appropriate to use a
verbal on-screen countdown, as this may have interfered with pro-
cessing of the presented sentence.) Pink noise (which consists of
equal energy per octave; generated using Audacity 2.0.2) began
playing through the provided headphones, simultaneously with
the countdown. The countdown was followed by a fixation cross,
which was present on the screen for 2 s. The participants were
informed that, if there was a voice present in the noise, it would
only appear when the fixation cross was present. Participants were
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I am happy
500ms
500ms
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Was there a voice in the noise?
P = present
A = absent
2 
Fig. 1. Schematic representation of a single trial in the AVI condition of the signal detection task. A sentence is presented to the participant (Screen 1), followed by a 1500 ms
countdown (Screens 2–4), followed by a fixation cross, which, on voice-present trials, was accompanied by a voice stimulus (Screen 5). Participants were instructed to
‘imagine saying’ the presented sentence when they saw the fixation cross, and then provide a response as to whether they believed a voice was present during Screen 6. The
proportion of the trial during which pink noise played is indicated by the dashed line.
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believed a voice was present in the noise.
The sentence presented to the participant always took the form
of the words ‘I am’, followed by an adjective (i.e., the participant
was required to repeat a sentence about themselves). Half of the
trials presented a positively valenced sentence (e.g., ‘‘I am happy”),
whereas the other half presented negatively valenced sentences
(e.g., ‘‘I am sad”). These sentences were rated for valence on a
Likert scale (1 = very negative; 7 = very positive), by a separate
subset of participants (N = 13), none of whom participated in the
main experiments. The ratings of the words used for positive sen-
tences (M = 6.04, SD = 0.42) were significantly higher than the
words used for negative sentences (M = 2.13, SD = 0.66), t(65.9)
= 31.53, p < .001 (equal variances not assumed). None of the mean
ratings for any individual positive words were rated lower than
any of the negative words. Positively and negatively valenced
sentences were also matched for number of syllables.
In 44/80 trials, a voice stimulus was embedded in the pink noise
as the fixation cross appeared on the screen, lasting for 1.5 s
(‘voice-present trials’). The stimuli in the voice-present trials
always spoke the same words that had been presented to the par-
ticipant, in a male voice. The pink noise remained at the same vol-
ume for all trials for all participants; that is, only the volume of the
voice stimuli differed between trials to vary the signal-to-noise
ratio (voice stimulus to pink noise volume ratio). The signal-to-
noise ratio in the trials varied between four different levels, based
on the performance of pilot participants (N = 10, none of whom
participated in the main experiment). Of the 44 voice-present trials
in each signal detection block, 8 consisted of stimuli that pilot par-
ticipants detected on 100% of trials, designed to ensure that all par-
ticipants in the main experiment could correctly detect some of the
voice stimuli. The remaining 36 trials were split evenly between
volumes at which pilot participants detected the voice stimuli on
75%, 50% and 25% of trials. This was designed to maximise the
ambiguity of the presented stimuli. In the remaining 36/80 trials,no voice was embedded in the noise (‘voice-absent trials’). The
44:36 ratio of present:absent trials was roughly based on previous
auditory signal detection studies (e.g., Barkus, Stirling, Hopkins,
McKie, & Lewis, 2007). Signal-to-noise ratio and the presence/
absence of a voice stimulus were balanced across valence of the
presented sentence.
2.1.3. Measure of hallucination-proneness and AVI-usage
The Revised Launay–Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS-R) was
used to assess hallucination-proneness. This 9-item measure was
adapted by McCarthy-Jones and Fernyhough (2011) from the 20-
item Launay–Slade Hallucination Scale used by Morrison, Wells,
and Nothard (2000). The scale assesses proneness to hallucinatory
experiences in both the auditory and visual modality. It has been
shown to have high internal reliability and a more valid factor
structure than previous versions of the Launay–Slade Hallucination
Scale.
Participants were also asked to estimate the extent to which
they had generated AVI at the appropriate time during the task,
giving a number between 0 and 100.
2.1.4. Procedure
Participants wore over-the-ear headphones (Logik LHHIFI10) to
complete the task. They were informed that they would be listen-
ing to bursts of noise, and listening out for a voice in the noise,
responding present/absent with a button press at the end of each
trial. All participants were told that some voices would be easier
to hear, whereas others would be quieter and harder to detect,
although they were not informed how often a voice was likely to
be present. For the AVI condition, participants were instructed to
‘‘imagine saying the sentence to yourself silently”, at the same time
as the fixation cross appeared on the screen. Participants were told
they did not need to deliberately move their mouth or speak aloud
during the main task, but simply to use auditory imagery of the
presented sentence. They were also informed that, if there was a
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as the fixation cross. During the practice phase of the AVI condi-
tion, participants were asked to speak the sentence out loud at
the required time point for the first four trials, to ensure that they
understood the instructions. If the participant did not vocalise the
sentence at the appropriate time point, the practice trials were
repeated until they were able to perform the task as requested.
After the practice trials, participants were asked whether they
understood the instructions relating to using AVI, and offered the
chance to repeat the practice if unsure. In the event that partici-
pants did not understand the instructions relating to AVI (which
was rare), various different descriptions were given to aid under-
standing (e.g., ‘inner speech’, ‘auditory imagery’ or ‘talking to your-
self in your head’). In the non-AVI condition, participants were
simply asked to detect a voice in the noise, but not given any
instructions about imagining a voice.
All participants completed both conditions of the SDT. The order
in which they completed the tasks was counterbalanced across
participants. Between the two blocks of trials, participants com-
pleted the self-report items (see Section 2.1.2), and completed sev-
eral other tasks (to be reported elsewhere).
2.1.5. Data analysis
Performance on the SDT was analysed using signal detection
theory. For each trial response, there were therefore four possible
outcomes: hit (voice-present, ‘present’ response), miss (voice-
present, ‘absent’ response), correct rejection (voice-absent, ‘absent’
response) and false alarm (voice-absent, ‘present’ response). From
these, signal detection parameters relating to response bias (b) and
sensitivity (d0) were calculated. Following Stanislaw and Todorov
(1999), b was calculated as follows: b ¼ e ZðFAÞ2ZðHÞ22
n o
. b, based on
the likelihood ratio of the signal and noise distributions, was cho-
sen as a measure of response bias to be consistent with previous
studies relating auditory signal detection performance to
hallucination-proneness (e.g., Varese, Barkus, & Bentall, 2011;
Vercammen, de Haan, & Aleman, 2008) which have shown robust
links to hallucination-proneness in a recent meta-analysis
(Brookwell et al., 2013). A b value <1 corresponds to a bias towards
responding ‘yes’, whilst a value >1 corresponds to a bias towards
responding ‘no’. d0 is defined as the difference between the stan-
dardised hit rate and false alarm rate, with a value of 0 represent-
ing performance at chance level.
There were two within group variables: task condition and sen-
tence valence. A median split was also performed on the data
according to score on the LSHS-R, grouping the participants into
high (scoringP 15 on the LSHS-R, N = 61) and low (scoring < 15,
N = 59) hallucination-proneness; hence there was one between
group variable: hallucination-proneness group (high/low). We
therefore performed a 2  2  2 mixed model ANOVA, with
response bias (b) as the dependent variable, and task condition
(AVI/non-AVI), sentence valence (positive/negative) and
hallucination-proneness group (high/low) as independent vari-
ables. This analysis was also repeated with sensitivity (d0) as the
dependent variable, to test whether the manipulation affected par-
ticipants’ ability to distinguish the voice from the noise. Where
data was non-normally distributed, Mann–Whitney U tests were
used during further analysis. Signal detection performance was
also modelled using regression analysis to investigate the contri-
bution of different variables to task performance in the different
conditions.
2.2. Results
Participants generally reported being able to complete the task
as instructed without difficulty, and reported using AVI with thefixation cross a relatively high amount (M = 91.7, SD = 9.0). There
was no difference in the amount of AVI-usage reported between
participants in the high (M = 90.58, SD = 9.2) and low (M = 92.88,
SD = 8.6) hallucination-proneness groups: t(117) = 1.40, p = .16,
d = 0.26. Descriptive statistics for response bias (b) and sensitivity
(d0) to the auditory SDT under the two conditions (AVI/non-AVI)
for high and low hallucination-prone participants, are shown in
Table 1.
2.2.1. Response bias (b)
For descriptive statistics, see Table 1. For b (response bias), a
2  2  2 mixed model ANOVA showed a main effect of task condi-
tion (AVI/non-AVI): F(1,118) = 5.99, p = .016, gp2 = .048, showing that
participants performed with a lower response bias in the AVI con-
dition (M = 2.41, SD = 2.7) compared to when not using AVI
(M = 2.97, SD = 3.01). There was no overall effect of hallucination-
proneness group (F(1,118) = 0.43, p = .51, gp2 = .004). There was
however, a significant task condition hallucination-proneness
interaction: F(1,118) = 4.47, p = .037, gp2 = .037, (see Fig. 2a). Further
analysis using Mann–Whitney U tests showed that the effect of AVI
appeared to be specific to highly hallucination-prone participants,
who had a significantly lower response bias in the AVI condition
(Mdn = 1.12) than in the non-AVI condition (Mdn = 1.79): z = 3.51,
p < .001, r = .45. In the low hallucination-prone participants, there
was not a significant difference in b between the AVI condition
(Mdn = 1.50) and the non-AVI condition (Mdn = 1.47): z = 0.11,
p = .91, r = .01. There was no effect of sentence valence on b:
F(1,118) = 1.18, p = .28, gp2 = .01, nor any interactions between
sentence valence and any other variables (all ps > .13).
Given that the use of median splits can sometimes result in spu-
rious interaction effects (McClelland & Judd, 1993), we also anal-
ysed this data using two separate regression analyses. In one
regression model, response bias (b) in the AVI condition was the
dependent variable, with b in the non-AVI condition and Launay–
Slade Hallucination Scale (hallucination-proneness) score (left as
a continuous variable) as independent variables. This model signif-
icantly predicted b in the AVI condition (F(2,119) = 23.3, R2 = .20,
p < .001), with both response bias in the non-AVI condition
(b = .41, p < .001) and hallucination-proneness (b = .193, p = .02)
emerging as independent predictors of response bias in the AVI
condition. In the second regression model, response bias in the
non-AVI condition was the dependent variable, with response bias
in the AVI-condition and hallucination-proneness (again, left as a
continuous variable) used as independent variables. This model
significantly predicted response bias in the non-AVI condition
(F(1,119) = 11.62, R2 = .17, p < .001), although only AVI-condition
response bias was a significant predictor (b = .41, p < .001), with
hallucination-proneness not significantly predicting performance
in this condition (b = .03, p = .74). Therefore, to summarise, when
controlling for performance on the other signal detection condi-
tion, hallucination-proneness only significantly predicted response
bias in the task condition in which participants used AVI.
Given that the to-be-detected voice was male, which could
feasibly affect task performance between genders, the effect of
gender on response bias was also investigated. There was no effect
of gender on signal detection task performance (F(1,116) = .12,
p = .73, gp2 = .001), and gender did not interact with task condition
(F(1,116) < .001, p = .99, gp2 < .001), valence (F(1,116) = .04, p = .84,
gp2 < .001), or hallucination-proneness (F(1,116) = .51, p = .73,
gp2 = .001).
2.2.2. Sensitivity (d0)
For descriptive statistics, see Table 1. For d0 (sensitivity), there
was no effect of task condition (F(1,118) = .148, p = .701, gp2 = .001)
or hallucination-proneness (F(1,118) = 2.09, p = .15, gp2 = .017), nor
any interaction between task condition and hallucination-proneness
Table 1
Means and standard deviations for Experiment 1, showing performance on the auditory signal detection task in the AVI and non-AVI task conditions, for high
and low hallucination-prone participants, for positively and negatively valenced stimuli (M, SD).
Hallucination-proneness Valence AVI Non-AVI
b d0 b d0
High Positive 1.74 (1.5) 1.12 (0.6) 2.55 (1.8) 0.98 (0.6)
Negative 1.83 (1.6) 1.10 (0.7) 2.47 (1.8) 1.03 (0.5)
Low Positive 2.37 (1.9) 0.92 (0.6) 2.36 (1.9) 0.93 (0.6)
Negative 2.15 (1.6) 0.90 (0.5) 2.17 (1.6) 1.00 (0.6)
AVI = auditory verbal imagery condition. Non-AVI = non-auditory verbal imagery condition. b = response criterion. d0 = task sensitivity.
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(F(1,118) = .316, p = .575, gp2 = .003), nor any interactions between
valence and any other variables (all ps > .23).
There was also no effect of gender on task sensitivity
(F(1,116) = .07, p = .79, gp2 = .001), nor any interaction between gen-
der and task condition (F(1,116) = .65, p = .42, gp2 = .006), valence
(F(1,116) = .05, p = .82, gp2 < .001), or hallucination-proneness
(F(1,116) = .40, p = .53, gp2 = .003).
2.3. Discussion
The first key finding from Experiment 1 was that when partici-
pants were instructed to use AVI during a signal detection task,
there was a significant drop in response bias. That is, participants
were more likely to respond that a voice was presented in the noise
when they engaged in AVI, regardless of whether a voice was
actually presented. However, using AVI did not affect participants’
sensitivity (ability to distinguish between the speech and the
noise). Importantly, the interaction between task condition and
hallucination-proneness indicated that the effect of AVI on
response bias was specific to participants who scored highly on0
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Fig. 2. Response bias (b) in Experiment 1 & 2 auditory signal detection task. (a) Perf
participants. AVI = auditory verbal imagery; non-AVI = non-auditory verbal imagery. (b)
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median. Error bars = 1 SEM. ⁄p < .01.self-reported hallucination-proneness, whilst there was no differ-
ence between the imagery conditions in participants who reported
few hallucinatory experiences. This finding suggests that the use of
AVI caused hallucination-prone participants to exhibit a lower
response bias. That is, when participants prone to hallucinations
generate mental imagery, they are more likely to respond ‘present’,
regardless of whether the stimulus was actually present or not.
This is consistent with models that suggest AVHs may occur when
inner speech is misattributed to an external source, which may link
to excessively vivid mental imagery, low levels of cognitive effort,
and/or aberrant predictive processes (Brookwell et al., 2013; Ford
& Mathalon, 2005).
It could be argued that previous findings of lower response bias
in signal detection tasks in hallucination-prone participants could
be due to a higher rate of spontaneous AVI usage. This interpreta-
tion, though, is not supported by the present data, which indicated
that there was no difference in AVI-usage between individuals
scoring high and low in hallucination-proneness. However, since
all participants were instructed to use AVI, this may have masked
potential differences in spontaneous AVI usage (a possibility that is
explored further in Experiment 2, below).(b) Experiment 2
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Performance on the cued condition of the SDT, split by reported level of AVI-usage,
AVI above the median; Low AVI = participants who reported levels of AVI below the
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valence of the imagined sentence on performance, nor any interac-
tion between valence and any other variables. This is consistent
with previous research showing that, on a source memory task,
the emotional valence of the stimuli did not affect performance
or interact with hallucination-proneness (Bendall et al., 2011).3. Experiment 2
Experiment 1 showed that using AVI during auditory signal
detection led to a reduction in response bias, specifically in highly
hallucination-prone individuals. However, one concern is that sim-
ply cuing participants with a sentence to imagine could have
altered task performance, and that the observed effect could be
due to priming of the sentence, rather than the use of AVI specifi-
cally (although the observed interaction with hallucination-
proneness would still be of interest). The data from Experiment 1
is not capable of addressing this concern. Because almost all partic-
ipants reported a high level of AVI use, it was not possible to deter-
mine whether the effect was specific to participants who engaged
in high levels of AVI. To investigate this, we therefore conducted a
second experiment, using identical stimuli, in which participants
were not instructed to use AVI, but were still cued with a sentence
before each signal detection trial. After task completion, partici-
pants were asked to report the extent to which they felt they
had used AVI whilst performing the task. The rationale for this
design was that it made it possible to investigate whether signal
detection performance was associated with AVI use, even when
participants were not explicitly instructed to use it. This design
also tested whether participants that were more hallucination-
prone reported using more spontaneous AVI, leading to a lower
response bias, or whether the two interacted (i.e., participants
who were both highly hallucination-prone and reported using high
levels of AVI had lower response biases, but the overall level of AVI
was not associated with hallucination-proneness). Based on the
findings in Experiment 1, therefore, for Experiment 2 we predicted
that there would only be a difference between the two task condi-
tions in individuals scoring highly on hallucination-proneness and
who reported using high levels of AVI whilst performing the SDT.
3.1. Materials and methods
3.1.1. Participants
The sample consisted of 60 participants from the undergraduate
and staff population of Durham University, UK, none of whom had
taken part in Experiment 1 (number of females = 48; mean
age = 19.73 years, SD = 2.5, range = 18–30 years). All participants
were native English speakers and none reported any hearing prob-
lems. In return for their time, participants were given course credit
or a small payment.
3.1.2. Procedure
Using identical stimuli and equipment as in Experiment 1, par-
ticipants completed two blocks of the SDT. Participants were given
the same instructions for how to complete the task, with the only
difference being that they were given no instructions relating to
AVI. Therefore, they completed two conditions: a ‘non-cued’ condi-
tion (identical to the non-AVI condition in Experiment 1) and a
‘cued’ condition (in which the same sentences as in Experiment 1
were presented before each burst of noise, but there were no AVI
instructions). Participants were informed that, in the cued condi-
tion, the sentence they were presented on-screen would be the
same as the voice they were instructed to detect, although they
were not required to be able to comprehend the sentence in the
noise to respond ‘yes’.As in the first experiment, participants completed the 9-item
LSHS-R as a measure of hallucination-proneness (see Section 2.1.3)
between the two blocks of the SDT. After completion of the tasks,
participants were presented with the following question: ‘This
question relates to the task in which you were presented with a
sentence before listening to the noise. When the fixation cross
appeared on the screen, did you find yourself using ‘inner speech’
to say the previously presented sentence? If yes, what percentage
of the time do you think you did this? (0–100)’.
3.1.3. Data analysis
As in Experiment 1, we performed a median split on the data
according to LSHS-R score (high: P15, N = 32; low: <15, N = 28).
We also performed a median split on the data according to the
amount of AVI reported by the participants (high: P75, N = 32;
low: <75, N = 28) and conducted a 2  2  2 mixed model ANOVA,
with task condition (cued/non-cued) as a within-subject variable,
and hallucination-proneness (high/low) and AVI use (high/low)
as between-subject variables. Due to the lack of effect of valence
in Experiment 1, we did not include valence as a within-subject
variable in this experiment. The dependent variable was response
bias (b) on the SDT. The analysis was also repeated using sensitivity
(d0) as the dependent variable.
3.2. Results
Participants reported using AVI (‘inner speech’) a relatively high
amount, considering that no instructions were given (M = 66.83,
SD = 29.1), although estimates ranged from the bottom to the top
of the scale (range = 0–100). A Mann–Whitney U test indicated that
there was no difference between the high (Mdn = 77.50) and low
(Mdn = 75.00) hallucination-proneness groups in the amount of
AVI retrospectively reported (U = 436, p = .86, r = .02).
3.2.1. Response bias (b)
For descriptive statistics, see Table 2. The 2  2  2 (task condi-
tion  AVI-usage  hallucination-proneness) mixed model ANOVA
with b as the dependent variable indicated that there was no effect
of task condition (F(1,56) = .097, p = .76, gp2 = .002) on b. That is, the
presentation of the to-be-detected sentence did not alter partici-
pants’ response biases. There was also no main effect of
hallucination-proneness (F(1,56) = .59, p = .45, gp2 = .01). There was,
however, a main effect of reported AVI-usage (F(1,56) = 4.46,
p = .039, gp2 = .074), indicating that participants who reported high
levels of AVI during the cued signal detection condition had a
lower response bias (M = 2.09, SD = 2.22) than those who reported
low levels of AVI (M = 3.55, SD = 2.92). There was no interaction
between condition and hallucination-proneness (F(1,56) = 2.17,
p = .146, gp2 = .037). There was also no interaction between task
condition and inner speech usage (F(1,56) = .01, p = .91, gp2 < .001).
There was a significant interaction between hallucination-
proneness and AVI-usage (F(1,56) = 4.62, p = .036, gp2 = .076),
although the three-way interaction between task condition,
hallucination-proneness and inner speech usage was not
significant (F(1,56) = 3.16, p = .08, gp2 = .053). However, given that
the interaction was close to significance, and that the AVI-usage
variable specifically referred to the cued condition, we explored
the result further by conducting two 2  2 [AVI-usage 
hallucination-proneness] ANOVAs, for the cued and non-cued
conditions separately.
For the non-cued condition, there was no effect of
hallucination-proneness (F(1,56) = 1.91, p = .17, gp2 = .033), no effect
of AVI-usage (F(1,56) = 2.36, p = .13, gp2 = .04) and no interaction
between hallucination-proneness and AVI-usage (F(1,56) = .44,
p = .51, gp2 = .008). This is unsurprising, since the measure of
AVI-usage specifically asked participants to estimate their usage
Table 2
Means and standard deviations for Experiment 2, showing performance on the auditory signal detection task, for high and low hallucination-prone
participants, who reported high and low levels of AVI (M, SD).
Hallucination-proneness AVI-usage Cued Non-cued
b d0 b d0
High High 1.04 (0.4) 0.87 (0.6) 1.38 (0.7) 0.86 (0.6)
Low 4.68 (4.2) 1.40 (0.5) 3.25 (3.6) 1.14 (0.6)
Low High 3.07 (3.5) 1.23 (0.6) 3.12 (3.7) 1.03 (0.5)
Low 2.27 (1.6) 1.04 (0.7) 3.87 (4.4) 1.11 (0.7)
AVI = auditory verbal imagery; b = response bias; d0 = sensitivity.
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was no main effect of hallucination-proneness (F(1,56) = .07, p = .80,
gp2 = .001), but there was a trend towards an effect of AVI-usage,
with participants who reported high levels of AVI (M = 1.99,
SD = 2.59) showing a lower response bias than those who reported
low levels of AVI (M = 3.56, SD = 3.41), F(1,56) = 3.75, p = .058,
d = 0.52. Importantly, in the cued condition, there was a significant
interaction between hallucination-proneness and AVI-usage
(F(1,56) = 9.12, p = .004, gp2 = .14). This interaction effect was
explored by conducting two Mann–Whitney U tests for the cued
condition, comparing b between the high/low AVI-usage groups
for both the high and low hallucination-proneness groups. This
showed that, for the low hallucination-proneness group, there
was no significant difference in b between the high (Mdn = 1.60)
and low (Mdn = 1.80) AVI-usage groups (U = 93.0, p = .84, r = .04).
However, for the high hallucination-proneness group, there was
a significant difference in b between participants who reported
high levels (Mdn = 1.01) of AVI-usage and those who reported
low-levels (Mdn = 2.53) of AVI-usage (U = 66.0, p = .02, r = .41).
Again, to further explore the data, we conducted a regression
analysis using response bias (b) in the cued condition as the
dependent variable. b in the non-cued condition, hallucination-
proneness score, inner speech usage, and the interaction term
(hallucination-proneness  inner speech usage) were included as
independent variables. Although hallucination-proneness score
was used as a continuous variable, inner speech usage was kept
as a dichotomous variable because a large proportion of partici-
pants reported either very high or very low levels of inner speech
(59.7% of participants reported using inner speech on either 0 or
>80% of trials). This model significantly predicted response bias
in the cued condition (F(4,59) = 4.26, R2 = .24, p = .004.), with b in
the non-cued condition (b = .32, p = .014) and hallucination-
proneness (b = .81, p = .027) significantly predicting response bias.
Inner speech usage was not a significant predictor (b = .19,
p = .116), although the inner speech usage  hallucination-
proneness interaction did significantly predict response bias in
the cued condition (b = .25, p = .033). When this analysis was
repeated with response bias on the non-cued condition as the
dependent variable, the model significantly predicted performance
(F(4,59) = 3.54, R2 = .21, p = .012), but only response bias on the cued
condition emerged as a significant predictor (b = .33, p = .014),
whereas hallucination-proneness (b = .30, p = .43), inner speech
usage (b = .12, p = .33), and the interaction between the two
(b = .05, p = .89), were not significant predictors. To summarise,
the regression analysis indicated that, when controlling for the
non-cued condition, hallucination-proneness, and inner speech
usage, the interaction between hallucination-proneness and inner
speech usage significantly predicted response bias on the cued
condition. However, these variables did not predict response bias
on the non-cued condition.
As in Experiment 1, there was no effect of gender on signal
detection response bias (F(1,53) = .10, p = .75, gp2 = .002), nor any
interaction between gender and task condition (F(1,53) = .29,p = .59, gp2 = .005), inner speech usage (F(1,53) < .001, p = .99,
gp2 < .001), or hallucination-proneness (F(1,53) = .001, p = .98,
gp2 < .001).
3.2.2. Sensitivity (d0)
For descriptive statistics, see Table 2. A 2  2  2 (task condi-
tion  AVI-usage  hallucination-proneness) mixed model ANOVA
with d0 as the dependent variable showed no significant effect of
task condition (F(1,56) = 1.98, p = .165, gp2 = .034), and no main
effect of hallucination-proneness (F(1,56) = 0.05, p = .82, gp2 = .001).
In contrast to b, there was no main effect of AVI-usage
(F(1,56) = 1.52, p = .22, gp2 = .026), and no interaction between
hallucination-proneness and AVI-usage (F(1,56) = 2.57, p = .12,
gp2 = .044). There was no interaction between task condition and
hallucination-proneness (F(1,56) = .254, p = .62, gp2 = .005). There
was also no interaction between task condition and AVI-usage
(F(1,56) = .02, p = .90, gp2 < .001). However, as with response bias
(b), there was an interaction, at the trend level, between task con-
dition, hallucination-proneness and AVI-usage (F(1,56) = 3.74,
p = .058, gp2 = .044). As with b, two 2  2 [hallucination-
proneness  AVI-usage] ANOVAs were conducted to explore this
further. For the non-cued condition, there was no effect of
hallucination-proneness (F(1,56) = .18, p = .68, gp2 = .003), no effect
of AVI-usage (F(1,56) = 1.35, p = .25, gp2 = .024), nor any interaction
between hallucination-proneness and AVI-usage (F(1,56) = .36,
p = .55, gp2 = .006). For the cued condition, there was no effect of
hallucination-proneness (F(1,56) < .01, p = .99, gp2 < .001), nor an
effect of AVI-usage (F(1,56) = 1.11, p = .30, gp2 = .019). However, for
the cued condition, there was an interaction between
hallucination-proneness and AVI-usage (F(1,56) = 5.23, p = .03,
gp2 = .085). Mann–Whitney U tests showed that, for participants
in the low hallucination-proneness group, there was no difference
in d0 between the high (Mdn = 1.23) and low (Mdn = 0.99)
AVI-usage group (U = 78, p = .37, r = .17). For participants in the
high hallucination-proneness group, those who were in the high
AVI-usage (Mdn = 0.85) group had a significantly lower d0 score
than those in the low AVI-usage group (Mdn = 1.37) (U = 57,
p = .008, r = 0.47).
As before, we further explored this finding by conducting a
regression analysis, this time with task sensitivity (d0) in each
condition as the dependent variable. d0 in the non-cued condition,
hallucination-proneness, inner speech usage, and the
hallucination-proneness  inner speech usage interaction term
were used as independent variables. Overall, the model signifi-
cantly predicted d0 in the cued condition (F(4,59) = 9.51, R2 = .41,
p < .001). However, only d0 in the non-cued condition was a signif-
icant independent predictor (b = .62, p < .001). Hallucination-
proneness (b = .36, p = .25), inner speech usage (b = .05, p = .61),
and the hallucination-proneness  inner speech usage interaction
term (b = .29, p = .36) were not significant predictors of d0 in the
cued condition. The same pattern of results emerged when d0 in
the non-cued condition was used as a dependent variable. d0 in
the cued condition was a significant predictor of d0 in the
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(b = .25, p = .44), inner speech usage (b = .07, p = .54) and the
interaction between the two (b = .15, p = .63) were not significant
predictors of d0 in the non-cued condition.
As in Experiment 1, there was no effect of gender on signal
detection task sensitivity (F(1,53) = .04, p = .84, gp2 = .001), nor any
interaction between gender and task condition (F(1,53) = .08,
p = .77, gp2 = .002), inner speech usage (F(1,53) = .57, p = .45,
gp2 = .011), or hallucination-proneness (F(1,53) = 1.82, p = .18,
gp2 = .033).3.3. Discussion
Experiment 2 used identical auditory and visual stimuli as
Experiment 1; only the task instructions differed, in that partici-
pants were not told that they should use AVI. After completing
the task, participants estimated the extent to which they had spon-
taneously engaged in AVI after being cued with a sentence. Both
response bias and sensitivity were affected by the presence of a
sentence cue only in participants who both (a) reported high levels
of hallucination-proneness and (b) reported using high levels of
AVI whilst detecting a voice stimulus (although it should be noted
that the three-way interactions only reached trend levels of signif-
icance). Nevertheless, these results indicate that if the sentence cue
did not cause participants to use high levels of AVI, then it did not
have an effect on task performance. However, within the group of
participants who used high levels of AVI, only those participants
who also reported high levels of hallucination-proneness showed
a bias towards perceiving a voice in the noise, and showed reduced
sensitivity, when cued with a sentence.
These results are partially consistent with the results from
Experiment 1: they indicate that highly hallucination-prone indi-
viduals show a lower response bias when using AVI. However,
unlike Experiment 1, the results from Experiment 2 indicated that
use of AVI also affected sensitivity to the task in highly
hallucination-prone individuals (although sensitivity was not pre-
dicted by hallucination-proneness in the regression analyses). This
was an unexpected finding, which may be explained by a greater
increase in the number of ‘false alarm’ responses relative to the
increase in ‘hit’ responses. That is, if the participant mistook inter-
nal, self-generated AVI for an external, non-self-generated
stimulus, it may have had a relatively smaller effect on the hit rate,
especially if presentation of a stimulus at a low signal-to-noise
ratio affected performance. For example, the presentation of voice
stimuli (even below a participant’s auditory threshold) may have
interfered with the likelihood that internally generated AVI was
mistaken as external.4. General discussion
To summarise, the two experiments reported in this paper
examined the effect of the generation of auditory verbal imagery
(AVI) on auditory signal detection, in participants who reported
high or low levels of hallucination-proneness. Experiment 1
showed that, when instructed to use AVI, participants showed a
lower response bias, being more willing to respond that a voice
was present in noise (regardless of its actual presence), compared
to performance on a standard auditory signal detection task. Fur-
ther analysis showed that this effect was specific to participants
who reported high levels of hallucination-proneness. Emotional
valence of the material being imagined did not affect performance.
Experiment 2 compared performance on a standard auditory signal
detection task, and a variant of the task in which participants were
cued with a sentence to detect, but not given any instructions to
use AVI. The results suggested that hallucination-proneparticipants only showed a lower response bias when they retro-
spectively reported using AVI, despite not being instructed to do
so. In Experiment 2, counter to expectations, there was some evi-
dence that task sensitivity was also affected by usage of AVI.
These findings provide support for models of AVHs which sug-
gest that they result from an external misattribution of an internal
mental event, such as inner speech (Ditman & Kuperberg, 2005;
Frith, 1992; Jones & Fernyhough, 2007b). The present studies par-
tially support previous findings which have shown lower response
biases in auditory signal detection, in both clinical and non-clinical
samples that report frequent hallucinatory experiences (Brookwell
et al., 2013), and extend the findings by showing that
hallucination-prone individuals only showed a lower response bias
when using AVI. As far as we are aware, previous studies that have
linked performance on signal detection tasks to hallucinations
have not incorporated variation in AVI/inner speech usage into
their study design.
Given that, in both experiments, there was no association
between level of reported AVI and level of reported
hallucination-proneness, the results cannot be explained in terms
of increased AVI usage in hallucination-prone individuals. Instead,
the results suggest that when hallucination-prone individuals do
use AVI, it is more liable to become externally misattributed. This
is consistent with the previously outlined inner speech models of
AVHs, suggesting that performance on reality discrimination signal
detection tasks may be related to problems with self-monitoring of
internally generated cognition. The present study does not, how-
ever, provide evidence to distinguish between precise mechanisms
at play in reality discrimination or self-monitoring biases. It is pos-
sible that hallucination-prone participants misattributed AVI due
to high levels of vividness of the imagery, making it harder to dis-
tinguish from a ‘real’ perception. High levels of vividness of mental
imagery may be a trait shared by hallucination-prone individuals,
which could lead to a higher likelihood of external misattributions.
Alternatively, low levels of cognitive effort associated with AVI
generation may have led to a similar effect in this group. Interest-
ingly, hallucination-prone participants in the present study
showed the opposite effect to that elicited by Perky (1910), instead
showing patterns of response more consistent with those reported
by Peterson and Graham (1974) or Farah and Smith (1983), who
showed facilitation of perception by use of mental imagery. How-
ever, the present data support the hypothesis that this may be due
to the effect of imagery on response biases, rather than sensitivity.
Neuroscientific findings describing activations in inner speech
and those occurring during AVHs have implicated speech produc-
tion areas, as well as primary and secondary auditory cortical
regions, in the generation of AVHs (Allen, Larøi, McGuire, &
Aleman, 2008), as well as showing higher levels of activity in audi-
tory cortical (including speech perception) regions when patients
with a diagnosis of schizophrenia use inner speech (Simons et al.,
2010). Ford et al. (2001) previously showed that inner speech
usage in hallucinating individuals was not associated with the
same cortical attenuation in response to an external stimulus as
in non-hallucinating individuals, suggesting that self-monitoring
failures, which may underlie lack of agency over inner speech,
are linked to aberrant predictive processes. To support this, a
recent study showed that cortical attenuation to self-generated
actions in individuals scoring highly on measures of schizotypy
was reduced (Oestreich et al., 2015). Furthermore, Moseley,
Fernyhough, and Ellison (2014) showed that modulating excitabil-
ity in superior temporal regions affected performance on a signal
detection task similar to the task used in the present study. In com-
bination with the present results, this might imply that
hallucination-prone individuals’ inner speech may be associated
with higher levels of vividness, reflected in higher levels of activity
in speech perception regions. This is supported by neuroimaging
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sample) rated as higher in vividness is associated with higher
levels of activity in speech perception regions (Zvyagintsev et al.,
2013). This is also consistent with the conclusions of Aleman
et al. (2003), who interpreted the effects of auditory imagery as
evidence of higher perceptual detail in the AVI of hallucinators,
and may suggest that earlier findings relating to the interaction
between imagery and perception (Farah & Smith, 1983) are linked
to reality discrimination biases through the perceptual detail
involved in auditory imagery. These findings suggest that cortical
attenuation in sensory regions, commonly linked to the sense of
agency, may be linked to perceptual detail in mental imagery,
and hence reality discrimination biases.
Unexpectedly, hallucination-prone participants did not show a
lower response bias on signal detection overall: the effect was only
observed when using AVI. In this respect, the results are inconsis-
tent with previous findings (e.g., Barkus et al., 2007; Rankin &
O’Carroll, 1995; Varese et al., 2011) which have suggested that
hallucination-proneness is associated with a lower response bias
in typical auditory signal detection. It is possible that task differ-
ences (for example, cueing the participants with a fixation cross
at the point of the voice stimulus presentation, even in non-AVI
versions of the task) could have affected performance in our study,
and may make our results in non-AVI conditions non-comparable
with previously conducted research. Interestingly, two studies
which have previously used auditory signal detection paradigms
in which participants were cued at the precise time point they
should attempt to detect a voice, reported no association between
hallucination-proneness and signal detection performance
(Hoskin, Hunter, & Woodruff, 2014; Vercammen et al., 2008). It is
possible that presentation of the cue with voice presentation
may have focused attention on voice detection, and therefore
reduced the rate of spontaneous AVI, which may have masked
the association with hallucination-proneness. In future experi-
ments, it would be informative to include a condition in which
no voice presentation cue is included, to test this hypothesis. A fur-
ther manipulation would be to engage participants in different
types of mental imagery (e.g., visual or motor imagery) to test
modality specificity of the effect of imagery on auditory signal
detection. If only use of AVI elicited lower response biases in
hallucination-prone individuals, this would provide further sup-
port for our interpretation that AVI could become misattributed
to an external source (the noise). In contrast, if this effect was also
elicited by visual imagery (on an auditory task), this would imply
that more general processes may underlie the effect.
Indeed, one possible objection to the interpretation of this data
as relating directly to the external misattribution of internal
mental imagery relates to the role of working memory, and the
cognitive load associated with generating AVI during the task.
Research has previously shown that increasing working memory
load can lead to a reduction in the sense of agency over self-
generated actions (Hon, Poh, & Soon, 2013). From our data, it is
not possible to rule out the possibility that the increased working
memory load (by presenting a sentence to be detected) may have
interacted with hallucination-proneness, which could underlie
the observed effect. However, this explanation seems unlikely,
given the relatively light cognitive load involved in our task. Hon
et al., for example, did not find an effect of working memory on
the sense of agency using a lower working memory load (two pre-
sented items), but did with a higher load (six presented items).
This therefore seems like an unlikely explanation for our results.
It is also not possible to rule out that attentional processes may
underlie the observed effect; for example, heightened attention to
the to-be-detected stimuli in the AVI condition may have increased
the participants’ willingness to respond that a voice was present
(although the reverse could also be the case, in that heightenedattention could plausibly decrease willingness to respond a voice
was present). Contemporary cognitive theories have suggested
that biased attentional processes may underlie some AVHs
(Hugdahl et al., 2008), and it is likely that reality discrimination
biases and attentional biases are not wholly independent con-
structs. Future research, though, should investigate the relation
between working memory, attentional biases and auditory signal
detection in relation to hallucinations.
A key area of research will be to understand what causes some
instances of AVI/inner speech to become misattributed, but not
others. The present study found no evidence that negatively
valenced words were more likely to become misattributed, which
does not provide evidence for the hypothesis that negative, ego-
dystonic thoughts may be externalised and experienced as a hallu-
cination (Morrison et al., 1995). This supports previous research
using source memory tasks, which found that words associated
with traumatic events were not more likely to be externally misat-
tributed (Bendall et al., 2011), but stands in contrast to research
suggesting that emotionally negative outcomes affect low-level
sensorimotor agency (Yoshie & Haggard, 2013) and higher-level
attributional biases (Mezulis et al., 2004). Previous research has,
however, shown that inducing negative affect in participants
causes an increase in the number of external misattributions on
a typical auditory signal detection paradigm (Hoskin et al., 2014;
Smailes, Meins, & Fernyhough, 2014). This might imply that the
content of the inner speech does not play a role in its misattribu-
tion, but instead a general state of negative affect may cause an
increase in the likelihood of external misattributions.
Furthermore, it is possible that the valence of the AVI may inter-
act with individual schemas relating to the self-concept; that is,
the likelihood that a negatively valenced statement will be exter-
nally misattributed may be related to the extent to which the indi-
vidual holds negative views about themselves. It is possible that a
negative self-concept would lead to fewer misattributions of nega-
tive items (as they may be more likely to be attributed to the self).
If this were the case, emotional valence of the stimuli used in the
signal detection task might be expected to interact with measures
of self-esteem or negative schemas relating to the self, as opposed
to proneness to hallucinations. Thus, future research should aim to
examine the role played by positive and negative beliefs about the
self, as well as the role of affective states, in modulating partici-
pants’ reality discrimination abilities. An alternative (although
not exclusive) possibility is that dialogic inner speech (that takes
on the quality of a back-and-forth conversation), or inner speech
that includes the voices of other people, may be more likely to
be misattributed under conditions of high cognitive load or stress
(Fernyhough, 2004; Jones & Fernyhough, 2007a). Further research
that manipulates qualitative aspects of AVI and investigates their
interaction with affective state is merited.
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